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I. Introduction 
 
Unemployment is still widespread across Europe. But while some nations are very successful 
in fighting their unemployment, others are still facing the same unemployment problems as 
years  ago.  A  common  explanation  for  this  is  the  existence  of  different  labour  market 
institutions. If rigid institutions are established, this will make for an inflexible labour market 
and create unemployment – this much is common knowledge. It is more difficult to explain 
why only some of the nations have these unemployment problems. Assuming unemployment  
is not wanted and assuming rational individuals in all the countries, the existence of rigid 
institutions and high unemployment for institutional reasons in only some of these countries 
cannot easily be explained. An exogenous difference in any underlying parameters is needed 
for  explaining  the  differences in  the  persistence  of  unemployment  rates  among  countries. 
Country-specific preferences may be a reason, but they are difficult to believe in, looking at 
the European integration process.   
 
The  size  of  the  nation’s  area  appears  to  be  one  possible  exogenous  reason.  The  theory 
presented here is based on an idea of Gilles Saint-Paul (2000), who described unemployment 
as part of an equilibrium on political markets. Adding to this the idea of agglomeration rents 
(see Baldwin/Krugman, 2004) in some regions, it can be explained why some nations want to 
fight their unemployment more vigorously than others. The distance covered by labour market 
institutions  plays  an  important  role,  because  distance  determines  the  extent  of  the 
agglomeration rent, and agglomeration rents are important for explaining the political choice 
of labour market institutions. According to this, Europe’s larger nations in area should be 
likely to have higher unemployment rates.  
 
Chapter  2  briefly  depicts  European  unemployment  figures.  Chapter  3  gives  an  excursive 
overview of common explanations for European unemployment. In chapter IV the concept of 
the agglomeration rent is explained, and Chapter V develops the ideas of Saint-Paul. Then it is  
shown empirically that, and under what conditions, larger nations have higher unemployment 
rates  (chapter  VI).  Lastly,  the  results  are  supported  by  some  further  facts  (chapter  VII), 




   
II. The Facts: High Regional Unemployment in Europe 
 
Both the extent and the persistence of unemployment rates differ considerably among the 
OECD countries. Today the United States exhibits a much smaller unemployment rate than 
the member states of the European Union. While the United States’ unemployment rates have 
never  shown  a  long  and  strong  increase,  but  have  ever  been  very  volatile,  European 
unemployment (EU15) started steadily increasing in the 70’s from 2% to more than 10% in 
the early 1990s. One can observe two cyclical declines at the end of the 1980s and of the 
1990s, but in both cases, unemployment has been rising again thereafter.  
 
Yet not only do large differences exist between the member states of the European Union and 
the United States, these differences are considerable within the European Union as well. The 
ten new member states have a higher average unemployment rate than the EU15, but most 
notable are the differences even within the EU15. Table 1 presents the unemployment rates of 
the EU15 for the years 1994, 1999 and 2004. In addition, it shows these numbers with respect 
to the European average unemployment rate. In the late 1990s, Europe as a whole experienced 
a clear reduction of its unemployment rates. In recent years, however, unemployment figures 
have risen again. Assuming an influence of business cycles, the figures are corrected for the 
European average. To the extent that an economic slump affected Europe as a whole, this 
influence  is  eliminated.  But  this  influence  is  not  yet  everything  corrected  by  using  the 
European average rate as a denominator. The relative rates also show which of the countries 
were more successful than the average, and which of them, though they were successful in the 
reduction of unemployment in terms of their absolute figures, lagged behind the average. In 
the last column, it is shown whether a clear trend can be observed. 










   




In two countries only (Austria and Luxembourg), unemployment has always been low since 
1994, while other countries have experienced a strong decline in recent years. Ireland, the 
Netherlands  and  the  United  Kingdom  must  be  mentioned  particularly  here.  In  Sweden, 
Denmark  and  Finland,  unemployment  went  up  sharply  until  the  middle  of  the  1990s, 
however,  it  declined  sharply  thereafter  as  well.  Belgium  and  France  were  successful  in 
reducing their unemployment rates, but compared to the European average this success was a 
small one. Only two nations show a negative trend, yet, in the case of Austria, this is a result 
of the three years selected in the table. Besides, the extent of unemployment is quite small in 
Austria so that one does not have to view this trend with too much concern. Thus, Germany is 
the only country which had to experience a permanent rise in its unemployment rate. Over the 
last decade, European unemployment rates show a clear convergence, however, there are still 
significant differences. The unemployment rates in France, Greece, Spain and Germany are 
still above 9%. This is more than twice the rate of the Netherlands and of Ireland. Even 
adjacent countries such as Portugal and Spain have shown completely different labour market 
results  despite  similar  historical  conditions  (Blanchard/Jimeno,  1995),  but  now  these  two 
seem to be converging gradually as well. 
 
Whereas the differences among the nations are diminishing, the regional unemployment rates 
show no signs of convergence (European Commission, 2001; European Commission, 2005).  
Figure 1 illustrates the regional differences. Graphics can be read as follows: At the vertical 
axis  the  nations  are  listed.  The  middle  of  each  nation’s  two  bars  represents  the  national 
average unemployment. For example, in Germany an average unemployment rate of 9.4% can 
1994 1999 2004 1994 1999 2004 trend
EU-15 10,4 8,5 8,1 1 1 1
Belgium 9,8 8,6 7,9 0,94230769 1,01176471 0,97530864
Denmark 7,7 4,8 5,4 0,74038462 0,56470588 0,66666667
Germany 8,3 7,9 9,5 0,79807692 0,92941176 1,17283951 negative
Greece 8,9 12,0 10,5 0,85576923 1,41176471 1,2962963
Spain 19,8 12,9 11,0 1,90384615 1,51764706 1,35802469 positive
France 11,7 10,5 9,6 1,125 1,23529412 1,18518519
Ireland 14,3 5,7 4,5 1,375 0,67058824 0,55555556 positive
Italy 10,6 10,9 8,0 1,01923077 1,28235294 0,98765432
Luxembourg 3,2 2,4 4,8 0,30769231 0,28235294 0,59259259
Netherlands 6,8 3,2 4,6 0,65384615 0,37647059 0,56790123
Austria 3,8 3,9 4,8 0,36538462 0,45882353 0,59259259 negative
Portugal 6,9 4,6 6,7 0,66346154 0,54117647 0,82716049
Finland 16,6 10,2 8,8 1,59615385 1,2 1,08641975 positive
Sweden 9,4 6,7 6,3 0,90384615 0,78823529 0,77777778 positive
United Kingdom 9,3 5,9 4,7 0,89423077 0,69411765 0,58024691 positive 
   
be observed. From the national average one bar leads horizontally to the right and the other 
one  to  the  left.  The  bar  leading  to  the  right  indicates  the  maximum  regional  extent  of 
unemployment in Germany. Halle as the region with the highest rate in Germany shows an 
unemployment rate of 27.1%. The deviation from the German average to the left shows the 
region with the smallest unemployment. This is Oberbayern with 3.8%.  
 
Figure 1  Regional Unemployment in Europe
1 
Eurostat Database 
   
Thus, national and regional differences can both be compared in this figure. The nation with 
the smallest unemployment is Luxembourg. The highest national average unemployment is 
exhibited  by  Spain,  whereas  the  region  with  the  highest  unemployment  can  be  found  in 
Germany. In Italy, important differences in the numbers of the unemployed can be observed 
as well. While Trentino Alto Adige shows an unemployment rate of just 2.6%, the rate in 
Calabria reaches 24.6%. Spanish regional unemployment rates differ from 5.5% in Aragon up 
to  19.6%  in  Andalusia.  Almost  any  larger  country  has  regions  with  high  unemployment. 
France, Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy and Finland all show a difference of at least seven 
percentage points between the unemployment rates in the regions with their smallest and 
those with their highest unemployment. Looking at a map, you will be disposed to divide each 
nation into a region being the economic core and another region being the periphery (such as 
Eastern Germany, Southern Italy), where the unemployment rate is particularly high. 
 
                                                 
1 French overseas departments are not included here. 

















deviation of the region with the lowest unemployment
deviation of the region with the highest unemployment 
   
III. Some Explanations: On Shocks and Institutions 
 
Explanations for high European unemployment are usually based on the interaction of shocks 
and  institutions  (Blanchard,  2005).  Mayor  shocks  for  Western  Europe  were  the  oil  price 
increases in 1973/1974 and 1979/1980 and the slowdown of the total factor productivity in the 
70’s.  A  shift  in  the  course  of  monetary  policy  to  counter  inflation  (in  order  to  establish 
European Monetary Union), a change in the labour demand linked to globalisation and labour 
saving technical progress and a more volatile economic environment can be added as well as 
some country-specific shocks such as the breakdown of the former Soviet Union (for Finland) 
and the German reunification. 
 
These shocks required either a decrease of the wages or at least a smaller increase of wages 
than before. Furthermore, a flexible and dispersed wage structure has become necessary. But 
European wage setting institutions have not responded, the bargained wages grew faster than 
the  warranted  ones.  In  order  to  understand  this  development,  the  differences  in  real  and 
nominal rigidities between the European countries have been used to explain why the same 
shock could cause a different increase of the unemployment rates. The negative impact of 
overdrawn wages on capital accumulation and the “insider-outsider theory” by Lindbeck and 
Snower (1988) could both explain why unemployment was persistent after the shocks and 
why it increased even further. Fundamental to the “insider-outsider theory” is the existence of 
different types of labour turnover costs, which create economic rent and give market power to 
the employed workers, called insiders (Lindbeck, 1993). This power can be used to force 
wages above the market clearing level without running the risk of dismissal. The unemployed, 
called  "outsiders",  bear  the  costs  in  the  form  of  unemployment.  The  theory  is  closely 
connected to the existence of trade unions and the degree of collective bargaining. Wage 
bargaining  in  Europe  typically  takes  place  between  the  representatives  of  the  employed 
workers and of the firms, whereas the unemployed are not involved. Unions caring only about 
the prospects of the currently employed will try to implement a wage so that employment 
remains the same. The interests of the unemployed are neglected in the bargaining process. 
On that account, the theory is very convenient to explain the persistence of unemployment. 
Another explanation is based on the role of human capital: a long duration of unemployment 
would lead to a loss of skills, lower the pressure of the unemployed on the bargained wages 
and make unemployment persistent as well (Layard/Nickell, 1987). However, for explaining 
the long time period of high European unemployment and the differences of unemployment  
   
throughout  Europe,  the  labour  market  institutions  of  the  European  nations  are  commonly 
considered to be the most important reasons. 
 
On top of the list is the centralisation of wage bargaining. For a long time, centralised wage 
bargaining has been claimed by many economists to be an appropriate institution concerning 
wage-setting and unemployment, for it allows the internalisation of externalities particularly 
with respect to inflationary pressures (Calmfors/Driffill, 1988; Blau/Kahn, 1999). This claim 
has  been  supported  by  presenting  empirical  cross-country  evidence  of  a  hump-shaped 
relationship between the countries’ degree of bargaining centralisation and their nation-wide 
unemployment and inflation performance. Whereas centralised (at the economy-wide level) as 
well as decentralised (at the firm level) wage bargaining exhibit good results, the outcome for 
bargaining  at  the  sectoral  level  has  been  analysed  to  be  the  worst.  Yet  for  centralised 
bargaining it is a crucial condition that the same wage is paid for the same job without respect 
to the region where the firm is located  or to the economic situation of the firm in which one is 
employed.  This  means  that  good  results  depend  on  workers  with  similar  educational 
background,  experience  and  profiles,  having  similar  productivity  as  well  as  on  a  similar 
productivity of similar firms in different regions. In a globalised and more volatile world, 
these conditions are problematic, particularly in heterogeneous countries, where productivity 
is  very  uneven  across  regions.  Only  decentralised  wage  bargaining  can  cope  with  the 
challenges of globalisation, a volatile economy and large regional differences. Equal pay for 
equal work is very likely to lead regions with a lower productivity to higher unemployment. 
In  1994  indeed,  the  famous  OECD  job  study  thus  recommended  a  more  decentralised 
bargaining. 
 
Another institution often seen as one major explanation for unemployment is the employment 
protection  legislation.  It  is  not  that  obvious  whether  and  how  EPL  affects  labour  market 
performance. Not only might some EPL be justified for reasons of equity, but for efficiency 
reasons as well. EPL can internalise some of the social costs which employers impose on 
society  in  dismissing  staff,  if  those  dismissed  receive  governmental  transfers  in  case  of 
unemployment.  Furthermore,  EPL  is  able  to  smooth  employment  over  the  business  cycle 
because firms will be more reluctant to fire workers in recessions as they must bear the costs 
of dismissal in the form of severance payments, or they must face the prospect of dismissed 
workers  (being  paid  for)  continuing  to  work,  but  unproductively,  while  they  are  still 
protected. Additionally, in a more specialised world firm-specific human capital is of prime  
   
importance.  EPL  can  tighten  the  working  relationship  between  firms  and  workers  thus 
encouraging  workers  to  invest  more  in  firm-specific  human  capital.  However,  EPL 
unambiguously reduces the flows in and out of unemployment by creating additional labour 
turnover costs. Once dismissed, it is more difficult for workers to obtain a new job, the higher 
the level of employment protection is. For this reason, EPL increases the segmentation of the 
labour  market  by  giving  the  insiders  more  market  power.  The  reduced  hiring  rate  makes 
unemployment more persistent. 
 
The  generosity  of  insurance  and  transfer  payments  to  the  unemployed  are  commonly 
considered to be the third important institutional determinant for the extent and duration of 
unemployment  (Layard/Nickel/Jackman,  1991;  Nickel,  1997;  Blanchard,  2005).  High 
benefits, paid for a long duration without restrictive criteria which govern what is expected of 
the unemployed in order to be granted these benefits, are a disincentive to work and thus 
cause unemployment, particularly long-term unemployment. Such benefits make employment 
at a low wage level appear unattractive. The guaranteed transfer income establishes a de-facto 
minimum wage. Similar to a real minimum wage (which is additionally implemented in most 
of the EU countries), it reduces labour market competition by the outsiders. As a result a more 
aggressive wage bargaining behaviour by the trade unions must be threatened, thus raising the 
wages  further  to  boost  the  insiders’  income.  Often,  active  labour  market  policy  provides 
additional  support  to  this  institutional  setting.  Programmes  for  long-term  unemployed  or 
special help for workers in depressed areas are brought into being in order to show political 
action. Though the intention looks to be good, these programmes reduce the willingness to 
accept  lower  wages  and  the  incentives  to  seek  a  job  elsewhere.  On  that  account,  some 
implications of active labour market policy are similar to those of direct transfer payments to 
the unemployed. 
 
It can be concluded that a few major reasons for unemployment are well known. They can be 
used for giving advice to policy makers. Modern economies need to reallocate their resources 
all the time. Institutions preventing this are responsible for unemployment. Admittedly, it is 
not  completely  clear  why  unemployment  is  that  high  in  just  a  few  European  countries. 
Knowing that institutions matter does not mean knowing which of them exactly plays what 
role and how they matter in any special case. Blanchard (2005) highlights the comparison of 
Spain  and  Portugal.  Both  countries  are  historically  similar  cases,  both  have  similar 
institutions,  but  both  have  shown  extremely  different  unemployment  rates  so  far.  
   
Furthermore, it is not necessary to compare two countries with different institutions. You can 
also  take  one  country  such  as  Germany  (or  Italy)  to  find  both  high  and  low  rates  of 
unemployment within one and the same institutional framework. 
 
 
IV. The Impact of Agglomeration Forces 
 
Significant  regional  economic  differences  inside  one  country  are  often  ascribed  to 
agglomeration processes taking place. Not only does the interaction of shocks and institutions 
play an important role, but also the interaction of agglomeration forces and labour market 
institutions  is  relevant  in  order  to  illuminate  European  unemployment.  Agglomeration  is 
usually  attributed  to  external  economies  of  scale.  The  underlying  condition  is  that  the 
profitability for each firm is the higher, the more other firms are near by. One cause of this 
externality can be the existence of technological external effects such as knowledge spillovers 
between firms. Yet for explaining why a European region has become a core, another reason 
is more appropriate – the existence of pecuniary spillovers will also lead to agglomeration 
(Krugman, 1991). New Economic Geography (NEG) calls this phenomenon market linkages 
– and these are either linkages to customer or to supplier firms. In a completely competitive 
world, these linkages would have no impact on welfare, yet, in a core-periphery-economy, the 
linkages do matter. 
 
The linkages work this way: producers want to be located where they have good access to 
large customer markets and at the same time a good access to suppliers of their inputs or 
required factors. A place with many customers is more suitable than a location without them. 
More producers in one region in turn attract more customers because they can offer a wider 
range of supply, more customers means a larger market, that is why  one producer will have 
more  customers.  The  better  market  access  will  attract  more  producers  again.  A  self-
reinforcing  process  will  be  induced.  These  effects  describe  just  the  opposite  of  what  is 
expected to occur assuming an allocation of firms according to the concept of neoclassical 
scarcity. Instead of having less customers, a new competitor in the market raises the number 
of customers for all suppliers. These linkages work on labour or capital factor markets in a 
similar way. A spatial concentration of economic activity emerges. Of course, scarcity works 
against these linkages, but when agglomerative forces dominate, the geographic outcome of  
   
increasing economic integration is the divergence of two initially similar regions into one core 
and a surrounding periphery. 
 
Since they have better access to markets, an agglomeration rent accrues to the firms in the 
economic core. In NEG models, this rent is poured out to the mobile factors. They earn more 
than in the periphery. That is why they are agglomerating in the core insofar as they are 
mobile enough (Baldwin/Krugman, 2004). The models usually analyse agglomeration for one 
factor – labour, capital, human capital or the mobile entrepreneur. Nevertheless, if there are 
such agglomeration linkages, they will make all mobile factors lump together, giving them an 
agglomeration rent. If there is a positive rent for being in the core, even the most mobile 
factor will be quasi-fixed then. 
 
One important condition underlying the agglomeration process concerns the distance between 
the core and the periphery. NEG incorporates transport costs in the form of iceberg costs, 
indicating that some goods are melting on their way from the place of their production to the 
place  of  their  consumption.  Baldwin/Krugman  (2004)  have  developed  a  bell-shaped 
agglomeration rent in “trade openness”. The parameter “trade openness” contains product 
heterogeneity and – more important (as heterogeneity can be assumed to be similar in EU) – 
transport costs. The idea of the agglomeration rent is as follows: When trade is completely 
free, agglomeration is useless because market access is always the same, wherever a firm is 
located. If trade is impossible, agglomeration processes will not take place either because 
firms could not serve the periphery markets from the core. At intermediate values of trade 
openness an agglomeration rent exists due to the linkages that are explained above. Whatever 
the shape of the rent in trade openness looks like exactly, NEG assumes it to be a function of 
the trade costs between the core and the periphery. Yet as there is only one core and one 
periphery in a typical NEG-model, there is only one distance to measure. For this reason, the 
parameter “trade costs” shows different values dependent on various degrees of economic 
integration, but not on different distances. Nevertheless, distance is important. In reality, one 
will not be just one core and one periphery, but a map of more or less concentrated regions. 
The extent of the agglomeration rent in the core depends on the core’s distance to the regions 
delivered  from  the  core  –  and  this  distance  varies  among  European  countries.  This  is 
particularly relevant, as some smaller nations are lucky to have no periphery of their own. 
  
   
There are increasing quantities of literature explaining the concentration of factors, production 
and customers in this particular manner. Most of these contributions are limited to the positive 
explanation of regional clusters. There are only a few contributions dealing with regional 
unemployment problems linked to agglomeration effects (see for example Overman/Puga, 
2002).  However,  a  direct  explanatory  connection  of  agglomerative  forces  and  regional 
unemployment  is  not  usually  the  topic.  The  reason  is  straightforward:  For  explaining 
unemployment,  wage  rigidities  have  to  be  assumed.  Consequently,  at  first  glance  the 
explanation  for  unemployment  is  the  same  with  or  without  agglomeration  taking  place. 
Agglomeration due to increasing economic integration might simply be seen as one other (and 
region-specific) economic shock. 
 
 
V. Unemployment and Institutions: The Political Insider 
 
Asking a labour market economist about European unemployment, you are likely to obtain 
the answer that it is of a structural nature and that a reduction of unemployment requires a 
change in the underlying institutions. Moreover, this very knowledge is also widespread in 
public. Obviously, there must be some winners in this institutional setting because it would 
otherwise have been abandoned a long time ago. A good explanation for this is offered by 
Saint-Paul  (2000).  His  theory  is  based  on  the  existence  of  rents.  Only  by  working  in  a 
perfectly competitive labour market can a worker who has lost his previous employment, find 
a new adequately paid job instantly. But labour markets are not perfectly competitive. The 
word "rent" is defined as the difference between the wage income earned at the current job 
and the alternative income outside this job. 
 
If any positive costs of labour fluctuation exist, they create a monopolistic situation between 
insiders and employers, allowing the employed to demand and achieve higher wages. For this 
reason, the rent is an appropriate measure of how far wages are above market clearing level. 
A positive rent means unemployment. The more frictions arise, the more important labour 
turnover costs exist, the higher is the rent and the more attractive is the inside option at the 
current employment. So far, this is an idea already known thanks to the insider-outsider-
theory. Yet not all frictions are naturally caused. Some of them simply arise due to imperfect 
observability and foresight, the impossibility of signing a complete wage contract and the 
heterogeneity of factors and jobs. However, others are caused by the chosen labour market  
   
institutions. EPL is an intuitive example. More protection creates higher labour turnover costs. 
So, in this sense, there is an additional rent created by a stronger EPL.  
 
Employed workers are acting – so Saint-Paul’s theory goes – similar to the insider-outsider-
theory of Lindbeck and Snower, but they do so on the political stage as well. First, they must 
set the stage to monopolise the labour supply. They organise themselves in labour unions to 
achieve market power on the labour supply side. Then the unions try to implement a wage 
above market clearing level to settle the claims of their members. Centralised bargaining at 
least at a sectoral stage is important to obtain the monopolistic status, and thus, the higher 
wages. Second, the higher the labour turnover costs are, the less competition is to be feared 
from the side of the unemployed. High EPL therefore is a useful instrument for employed 
workers to avoid pressure on their wages. In the political process, employed union-workers 
are likely to vote for high EPL and centralised bargaining. 
 
Third, there must exist a fixed factor, whose quantity does not change when the input of 
union-workers  is  reduced.  Only  if  there  is  such  a  fixed  factor,  can  an  increasing  wage 
redistribute income from the fixed factor to the union-workers. Saint-Paul admits that this 
idea is nothing new but just the traditional conflict between capital and labour – as long as 
capital is the fixed factor. Yet since capital is said to be the mobile factor today, Saint-Paul 
decided to focus on human capital as the immobile factor instead. On this basis, he developed 
a conflict between more and less skilled workers. The less skilled workers exploit the more 
skilled  ones.  Admittedly  this  conflict  described  by  Saint-Paul  does  exist  in  Europe.  But 
focussing only on this one, the explanation will be inadequate. 
 
Agglomeration forces make all the mobile factors partly immobile in the respective core. Up 
to the agglomeration rent, they can be expropriated without moving into the periphery. One 
may argue that these factors have the choice of going to another core (as there are a few core 
regions in Europe), but remember that distance matters. Not many mobile factors are really 
footloose,  because  they  may  lose  access  to  the  specific  national  market,  if  they  move 
(otherwise we should observe only one core region for the whole of Europe). For this reason, 
the mobile factors are exploitable – and it is consequential that the immobile workers in the 
core will try to get their desired share of the agglomeration rent. 
  
   
Now the political equilibrium can be outlined. There is one group – the employed union-
workers – who are in favour of rigid labour market institutions. The support comes from the 
employed workers in the core. But not all of them are backing any rigid institutional setting 
because higher rents also mean a higher risk of becoming unemployed. This risk harms the 
employed, hence, only a subset of employed workers will vote for the rigidities. Owners of 
mobile factors will be against the institutional rigidities as will the unemployed (assuming that 
they are informed well enough). However, their disapproval of the institutions is dependent on 
their transfers while unemployed. After all, high benefits to the unemployed are a necessary 
part of the scenario to keep the unemployed quiet. 
 
 
VI. European Unemployment and the Size of the Nation 
 
Observing political markets in European countries, the story outlined appears to be not far 
from  reality.  In  many  countries,  it  is  common  knowledge  and  frequently  published  that 
institutions are too rigid, but no reforms are taking place. The subset of employed workers in 
the  core  obviously  represents  a  politically  powerful  group.  Based  on  the  outlined  theory 
including  agglomeration  rents,  it  is  now  possible  to  explain  the  regional  differences  of 
European unemployment rates. 
 
Let us first assume a small country, where industry has agglomerated. It is so small that all 
employees can work in the industrial core. Centralised institutions chosen by the majority or 
under the strong political pressure of employed union-workers are likely to bring high wages, 
all the rigid institutions described above, and, consequently, some unemployment as well, but 
without losing the mobile factors. Now consider another small country, where there is not that 
much industry agglomerated. This country can be viewed as a periphery. There are no mobile 
factors, and consequentially, there is no rent to exploit. Wages can be set above the market 
clearing level, but this is not as profitable as it is in the core. Admittedly, even in countries, 
which you would classify as a periphery, there is a small core and there are small income 
differences.  Therefore,  a  small  rent  is  arising,  and  collective  bargaining  and  centralised 
institutions  can  be  established  to  annex  this  rent.  However,  there  will  be  only  a  low 
unemployment rate as well, for the rent is small, and this limits the bargained wages. 
  
   
On the other hand, assume two large countries with both a core region and a periphery. Many 
union-workers are supposed to be not mobile enough to supply their labour in the core. Now 
the subset of employed workers is divided: The workers in the core want the agglomeration 
rent in the core to be shared. They are willing to accept some unemployment to achieve higher 
wages and get their share of the agglomeration rent. The workers in the periphery will not 
favour this wage. They are less productive than those in the core, so they were not able even 
to cope with a wage that would be just market-clearing in the core. In a country with a small 
core and a large periphery, the outcome could be the same as in the small country that consists 
of periphery only, if the majority is represented by a periphery worker.  
 
But if there exists a large industrial core in such a country, the political power is likely to be 
held by a worker in the core. In case of having centralised institutions (which means that 
political decisions are effective in the whole country), the outcome will be one of high wages 
(like in the small country with an industrial core), of exploiting the rents of the agglomerated 
area, though the periphery cannot cope with the bargained wage. High unemployment arises. 
Firms which would have remained in the periphery, if they had not to pay core wages, will 
also  leave.  Moreover,  even  the  immobile  workers,  having  lost  their  jobs,  only  have  the 
alternative  of  remaining  unemployed  and  receiving  benefits  from  the  government  or  of 
moving  to  the  core.  Yet  in  the  core  they  would  be  unemployed,  too.  This  can  raise 
unemployment in the core as well. In this very country, the outcome is excessively high 
unemployment in the periphery and a higher unemployment than in other core areas as well. 
Additionally,  high  unemployment  benefits,  active  labour  market  policy  and  central 
government spending in the periphery are likely to be used to keep people there (because of 
the unwanted competition), and interregional transfers alleged as help prevent the financial 
collapse of the poor region. 
 
The influence of distance is one of the most important assumptions for explaining regional 
agglomeration  as  well  as  the  extent  of  the  arising  agglomeration  rent.  Thus,  it  may  be 
supposed that the size of the area which is covered by a setting of institutions has an important 
impact  on  unemployment  by  creating  agglomeration  rents.  In  Europe,  labour  market 
institutions  are  usually  implemented  by  nation  states  on  the  national  stage.  Hence,  small 
countries, having either no core region or no periphery region, should have no unemployment 
problems, whereas in large countries having both kinds of regions higher unemployment rates  
   
are likely to be found.  Figure 2 shows that there is indeed a very strong correlation between 
the geographical size of a nation and its unemployment rate. 
 
Figure 2 
Unemployment rate (2004) and nation’s size in EU15
2  
R
2 = 0,38 
Eurostat-Database 
 
We have also proved correlation for several years. The equation of the OLS-regression for 
each year reads as follows: 
U=c+βd +u, 
 
where U is the unemployment rate, d is the distance (the root of the country’s size) and u the 
residual vector. Β is the estimated coefficient. Note that not area itself but its root is used, 
because the variable required is one-dimensional
3. The outcomes of the OLS regression are 
presented below (table 2). 
                                                 
2 We rely on EU15 figures, because it can be assumed that EU15 states have a comparable infrastructure. Thus, 
area (or its root) is a good measure for distance within a nation. Moreover, EU15 countries can be assumed to be 
quite similar in terms of their preferences and their amount of human capital, at least in a comparison to other 
nations such as the ten new member countries. 
3 For larger nations with more than one core, the distance between core and periphery is obviously overestimated 
by area. This is attenuated by using area’s root. A better solution would be to reconfigure the estimator in case of 
having definitely more than one economic core. For European countries the parameter appears to be suitable,  
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Table 2   
Estimated impact: root of area’s size (in km
2) on the unemployment rate  
in EU15-nations
4 
  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Constant c  4,89  4,60  4,29  3,55  3,24 
Estimated coefficient β  0,0118  0,0114  0,0120  0,0125  0,0116 
t-stat. (of β)  2,7  2,9  3,4  4,2  3,9 
p-value (F-stat)  0,018  0,012  0,005  0,001  0,002 
R-squared  0,36  0,39  0,48  0,57  0,54 
 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Constant c      2,90  2,62  2,57  2,98  3,87  4,51 
β  0,0116  0,0094  0,0086  0,0087  0,0073  0,0066 
t-stat. (of β)  3,6  3,3  3,2  3,4  3,14  2,8 
p-value (F-stat)  0,004  0,005  0,007  0,005  0,008  0,014 




The estimation output suggests that the size of a nation has indeed a significant impact on its 
unemployment rate. This impact appears to be relatively stable over time
6. Larger European 
nations can be divided into a core and a periphery, and their labour market institutions are not 
suited for both of the regions. Smaller countries do not face this problem. And they show  
significantly lower unemployment rates. 
 
The impact of the country’s size on unemployment is assumed to exist because of a stronger 
divergence of interests between the decisive voter of the national institutions and the workers 
living  in  the  periphery.  Hence,  the  ratio  of  the  average  income  in  the  periphery  and  the 
average income in the median income region of the nation should be an appropriate measure 
for this discrepancy. Remember that a small core with a higher productivity cannot explain 
high unemployment as long as the decisive voter is not to be found in the core. On the other 
                                                 
4 French figures include overseas departments. 
5 By coincidence, the same value of R-squared can be observed using area’s size and its root.   
6 Remarkably, the estimated coefficient is getting a little bit smaller in recent years. This may reflect falling 
transport costs in Europe, lowering the agglomeration rent, but it could also be caused by changes in the overall 
unemployment rates throughout Europe.  
   
hand, a small periphery with a lower productivity than the average is likely to be overruled. 
This is considered in the next step.  The descriptive statistics are presented first. The first 
column of table 4 shows the unweighted average of all regions’ average income per capita, 
the second the average income of the median region (all regions corresponding to NUTS2), 
the third shows the average income per capita of the poorest region, and the fourth column the 
relation  of  the  third  to  the  second  (called  “P1rel”).  The  fifth  extends  this,  showing  the 
unweighted average income of the three poorest regions (as long as there are 3 regions poorer 
than the average, otherwise the value is 1), and the sixth column again relates this figure to the 
median (“P3rel”). Column 7 depicts the standard deviation (SD) of the regions’ income from 
their median region. The last column shows the corresponding unemployment rate. All figures 
are from 2002. 
 
Table 4   
Summary of descriptive statistics:  
Regional Differences in EU15-nations (in percentage of EU25 average income) 
(year: 2002)
7  











Belgium 112,89 103,2 74,9 0,72577519 80 0,7751938 44,36 7,3
Denmark 122,5 122,5 122,5 1 122,5 1 0 4,5
Germany 102,81 102,8 66,5 0,64688716 68,93 0,67052529 26,68 8,2
Greece 75,78 77,3 58,3 0,7542044 59,8 0,77360931 14,08 10,3
Spain 93,13 89 61,6 0,69213483 69,13 0,77674157 18,74 11,4
France 96,35 96,3 57,3 0,59501558 61,5 0,63862928 21,67 9,2
Ireland 119,5 119,5 91,5 0,76569038 119,5 1 39,6 4,4
Italy 107,91 118,3 67,7 0,57227388 70,3 0,5942519 27,4 9,1
Luxembourg 212,7 212,7 212,7 1 212,7 1 0 2,4
Netherlands 116,03 106,3 90,4 0,85042333 94,7 0,89087488 21,06 2,6
Austria 116,71 112,9 81,5 0,72187777 93,77 0,83055802 26,67 4,1
Portugal 76,66 66,5 61,5 0,92481203 62,53 0,94030075 18,82 5
Finland 113,38 99,2 81,9 0,82560484 92,9 0,93649194 29,84 9,1
Sweden 109,59 103,4 97,9 0,94680851 98,9 0,95647969 19,99 4,9
UK 110,41 102,3 72,6 0,70967742 74,9 0,73216031 39,98 5,1  
Eurostat Database 
 
At first, note that a larger area entails a higher margin for a lower relative regional income. Of 
course, this is not a law of nature, but the statistical correlation between the size of the nation 
(measured in km
2) and the relative income of the poorest region (P1rel and P3rel) can be 
                                                 
7 French overseas departments are included.  
   
seen
8. Interestingly, it is not the dispersion (measured in SD) per se related to the size of the 
nation (it is almost independent), but the relation of the poor regions’ income to their median 
regions’ income turns out to be linked to the size. This is an expected result as this difference 
is used to measure the agglomeration rent, and this rent is explained mainly by transport costs, 
that means by distance. Hence, the difference in income of the poor region(s) to the median 
region is of relevance for explaining national unemployment rates. 
 
Table 5   
Impact of the size (in km
2) on the relative regional income 
Estimated influence  on P1rel  on P3rel  on SD 
Estimated coefficient  -3,43E-07  -3,58E-07  5,93E-06 
t-ratio  -2,04  -2,18  0,33 
p-value  0,062  0,048  0,744 
R-squared  0,243  0,267  0,008 
 
In  Table  6  it  is  estimated  how  the  relative  incomes  P1rel  and  P3rel  affect  national 
unemployment rates. The results are significant. The national unemployment rate depends on 
how poor the nation’s poorest (one or three) regions are in relation to the median income 
region. This is compatible with the theory that the interests of the poor regions are neglected 
in the political process of setting labour market institutions.  
 
Table 6  
 Impact of having poor regions on the national unemployment rate (2002) 
P1rel  Unemployment 02  P3rel  Unemployment 02 
Estimated 
coefficient 
-13,28  Estimated 
coefficient 
-13,15 
t-ratio  -2,99  t-ratio  -2,94 
p-value  0,010  p-value  0,011 
R-squared  0,408 
       
R-squared  0,401 
 
 
                                                 
8 Note that US income is more evenly distributed across regions. This could be one reason for their lower 
unemployment.  
   
To  support  theory  further,  a  multiple  OLS-regression  shows  the  impact  of  both 
parameters.  As  distance  is  assumed  to  cause  unemployment  by  having  an  impact  on 
agglomeration rents, significance should decrease now for each factor of the regression. The 
new member states are included here by using dummies. The reason for this particularly is 
that – for the same distance – trade between core and periphery causes higher transport costs 
in  Eastern  European  countries  as  their  infrastructure  is  not  as  good  as  in  EU15.  The 
regression’s equation is as follows: 
 
U = c + β1 d + β2 e d + β3 p3rel + β4 e p3rel + u, 
 
where U, d and p3rel are defined as described above. Vector e is the dummy variable 
being 1, when a new member state is observed, and 0, when it is an EU15 country. Having 
observed heteroscedasticity, white heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used to 
test. 
   
Table 7 
Estimation for EU25 
 
Variable  Estimated β  t-statistics  Probability 
c  10,13  1,95  0,065 
distance  0,0076  2,25  0,036 
distance  new 
members 
0,0135  2,38  0,027 
p3rel  -8,28  -1,73  0,099 
p3rel new members  4,11  1,85  0,079 
  R-squared 
adjusted 
0,535   
  observations  25   
  Durbin-Watson  1,79   
  Prob. (F-stat.)  0,0005   
 
The results confirm the theory throughout Europe. The size of the nation’s area impacts 
the national unemployment rates in Europe, and the mechanism appears to be working in just  
   
the way described in the theory
9. Generally, it can be concluded that national unemployment 
rates are lower  
·  the more equal the nation’s poor regions are in relation to the median region, 
·  and the more decentralised the labour market institutions are designed. 
 
 
VII. Some further facts 
Using a least square regression containing only 25 nations, it is necessary to give some further 
facts to support the results. This is done nation by nation for all EU15 countries. Some nations 
are described very well by the empirical analysis, others are not. Table 7 shows the difference 
of the nations’ estimated figures (using distance and P3rel respectively for the estimation) to 
their observed unemployment rate. Any larger differences have to be explained. 
 
Table 7 
Estimated and observed values nation by nation 






 (β of table 2) 
estimated 
by P3rel  
(β of table 6) 
value 
estimated by area 
and  observed 
value 
value 
estimated  by 
P3rel  and 
observed value 
Belgium  7,5  4,5  7,4  -3,0  -0,1 
Denmark  4,6  4,8  4,4  0,2  -0,2 
Germany  8,7  8,2  8,7  -0,5  0,0 
Greece  10,3  6,2  7,4  -4,1  -2,9 
Spain  11,5  9,1  7,4  -2,4  -4,1 
France  9,2  9,9  9,2  0,7  0,0 
Ireland  4,4  5,3  4,4  0,9  0,0 
Italy  9,0  7,7  9,8  -1,3  0,8 
Luxembour
g  2,6  3,4  4,4  0,8  1,8 
Netherlands  2,8  4,7  5,9  1,9  3,1 
Austria  4,0  5,5  6,6  1,5  2,6 
Portugal  5,0  5,6  5,2  0,6  0,2 
Finland  9,1  8,0  5,3  -1,1  -3,8 
Sweden  5,1  8,8  5,0  3,7  -0,1 
UK  5,1  7,3  7,9  2,2  2,8   
 
                                                 
9 According to the theory there should be a very high correlation of area and P1rel respectively P3rel. Hence, we 
fear multi-collinearity. Nevertheless, for the multiple regression containing both factors see appendix.   
   
Explanations start with Germany and Italy. Both show a large area, a core and a periphery 
region and a relatively high unemployment rate. Germany is the prime example to confirm 
the theory. After German reunification, all the institutions of the West were introduced in the 
East without any major modifications. Only the unemployment assistance was defined a little 
bit lower than in the West. The wages for Eastern Germany were bargained by the social 
partners of the West, though East Germany’s productivity had been much lower than West 
Germany’s. This caused high unemployment in the East. If one adds to this wage bargaining 
procedure the threat felt by many Westerners of facing low wage competition, the resulting 
high wages and unemployment rates in the East cannot cause any surprise. They are part of 
the desired labour market equilibrium for West German workers. 
 
Italy had already taken similar political measures a few decades ago, so Germany’s mistake 
was not new (Sinn/Westermann, 2001). In 1968, wages in Italy were harmonised under the 
pressure of the trade unions. In succeeding years, the differences in the unemployment rates 
of the highly productive north and the less productive south grew from only 2.5 percentage 
points in 1970 to 14.6 percentage points in 1996. Since 1993, Italy has shown some attempts 
to  decentralise,  however,  both  the  differences  in  unemployment  and  the  national 
unemployment rate are still high. 
 
On the other hand, for rich countries such as Luxembourg, the Netherlands or Austria as well 
as for a poor country such as Portugal, almost no unemployment problems can be observed. 
This is caused by the relatively high income of their poorer regions compared to the median 
region, and it can be put down to the negligible distances as well. Austria even shows an 
unemployment rate of 2.6 percentage points less than expected, when estimated by P3rel, and 
1.5 percentage points less than expected by area. A closer look at the figures shows that in 
Austria  it  is  not  the  periphery,  but  Vienna  (the  richest  area)  which  has  the  highest 
unemployment rate. Moreover, the distance between the peripheral Steiermark (P1) and the 
rich capital is so small that the problem is not living in the periphery but working in the core. 
This means that area and P3rel may overestimate the influence of agglomeration in Austria. 
The Netherlands also seem to be overestimated for the same reason, and the region with the 
highest unemployment there is a core region as well (Groningen is the third richest region in 
the Netherlands). Hence, Austria, the Netherlands and Luxembourg should all be seen rather 
as a core themselves. Portugal is an example of a poor country always having had rigid EPL,  
   
but no high unemployment. Enough wage flexibility and low negotiated wages have been 
achieved despite a centralised system, for the Portuguese cannot exploit an economic core. 
 
Belgium and Sweden both are good examples to show why not the area itself but the distance 
and also the income relative to the median region matter most. Belgium has only a small area, 
but area clearly underestimates the Belgian unemployment rate. Due to the sharp economic 
differences between the Walloon part, the capital and the Flemish part, institutions cannot be 
suitable for Belgium as a whole. In Sweden just the opposite is true. Since Sweden’s poorest 
region shows an income of 94,68% compared to the median region, distance overestimates the 
unemployment rates. The small income difference is obviously not enough to create persistent 
high unemployment. Sweden shows just the unemployment rate that could be expected due to 
its P3rel value. What cannot be explained by the theory presented here is Sweden’s higher 
unemployment rate during the 1990s and the decline of the rate. Perhaps it was caused by the 
shock due to a change in wage bargaining from a centralised and co-ordinated system to 
industry or even firm level bargaining. 
 
The greatest discrepancies between estimated and observed rates, however, are shown by 
Greece, Spain and Finland. All of them have a higher unemployment rate than expected. Yet 
the reasons are different. In Finland an unemployment rate of 9,1% is observed. This is almost 
four percentage points higher than estimated by P3rel. But Finland shows a clear trend to a 
lower unemployment rate for the last 12 years (see table 1). The breakdown of the former 
Soviet Union might have been the shock that caused the high unemployment in Finland. 
Regional differences are not that important, hence there is no core dominating the peripheral 
regions in setting institutions. Finland should soon overcome the shock. Greece and Spain on 
the  other  side  both  are  notorious  for  their  highly  centralised  labour  market  institutions 
(Bosworth/Kollintzas, 2001; Mauro/Spilimbergo, 1999). Additionally, it has to be taken into 
account  that  Greece’s  size  of  area  underestimates  distance  in  Greece  because  of  the 
geographical shape of the country and the importance of many islands. Sterea Ellada – the 
core region and the only one above European average income – is fortunately in the middle of 
Greece, but still difficult to reach from some peripheral regions. 
 
For Spain, you cannot put forward such a statistical excuse. Spanish unemployment is higher 
than expected with regard to both the area and P3rel – and it was even higher in the past. The 
reason has been an excessively centralised wage bargaining joined by a rigid EPL, a fairly  
   
generous unemployment benefit system as well as a minimum wage legislation, all of them 
centralised. Especially setting a nationwide wage floor in sectoral agreements enabled the 
insiders  in  core  regions  to  prevent  low  wage  competition  from  the  periphery.  Special 
programmes have been set up to help unemployed in depressed areas, but these programmes 
have reduced workers’ willingness to migrate and seek a job elsewhere (Mauro/Spilimbergo, 
1999). Ongoing decentralisation over the last few years has recently lowered unemployment 
considerably. Especially the possibility for firms to opt out (since 1994) and the agreement 
between trade unions and entrepreneurs to stipulate negotiations at the firm level (1997) may 
have been an important help.  
 
France shows almost the unemployment rate as estimated by P3rel. Yet it must be conceded 
that this good estimation result is only achieved by including the overseas departments with 
their high unemployment rate. But this is not inadmissible: The departments face the same 
French laws, and moreover, despite huge differences in underlying economic parameters and 
in income, a region such as French Guiana shows high wages. In 1999, of all French regions 
only  Ile  de  France  had  higher  average  wages  than  French  Guiana.  Excessively  high 
unemployment (about 25%) in French Guiana has been the result. 
 
The United Kingdom, often described as a nation having very decentralised labour market 
institutions, is the counterexample to Spain and Greece. It shows an unemployment rate lower 
than estimated both by area and by P3rel. Hence, labour market decentralisation is likely to be 
a  suitable  instrument  in  preventing  high  unemployment  rates.  For  a  large  nation’s 
government, decentralisation is the only chance to avoid unemployment. The US is another 
example  for  this.  Larger  than  any  European  country,  they  only  have  a  moderate 
unemployment rate, which can be ascribed to the decentralised institutions in the US. Thus 
decentralised  labour  market  institutions  and,  more  particularly  a  decentralised  decision-
making on the political stage concerning these institutions, are important for larger nations to 
have low unemployment. But obviously this is a difficult task. Even nations as decentralised 
as  the  UK  and  the  US  do  not  reach  the  low  unemployment  rates  of  the  Netherlands  or 
Luxembourg. And this is not the end of the scale: Switzerland (41285 km
2; 2.5% in 2002), 
Liechtenstein (160 km
2; 1.4% (2002)) and Andorra (468 km
2; 0% (estimated in 1996)) are 
further examples of what small nations can achieve in fighting their unemployment. 
 
  
   
VIII. Concluding remarks 
 
The  European  Union  is  an  institution  which  is  facing  large  differences  in  its  regional 
economic performance. There exist a few core regions, but lots of periphery as well. This 
regional inequality creates an agglomeration rent in the core regions. Core workers are trying 
to get their share of this rent by setting suitable institutions on the labour market if possible. 
This is a problem, if one and the same labour market institution contains both the core and the 
peripheral  regions,  as  the  institutions  chosen  by  core-workers  make  for  excessively  high 
unemployment in the periphery. Nations with a larger area are more likely to have both a core 
and a periphery. Hence, larger nations in Europe indeed have higher unemployment rates, but 
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